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A WORD OF INTRODUCTION 
Somewhere some poor bloke looked at a radar screen and thought he saw 
something and knew that if he hesitated a thousandth of n second his own coun- 
try would be wiped ofl the face of the earth. So he p w h d  a button and the 
world went crazy. . . . This is the explanation given in the film On the Beach 
for the start of the Third World War. A piece of fiction? It could be; but many 
scientists and military men have said that the fear of SURPRISE ATTACK has 
become so strong in the minds of some that a flo'ck of geese flying in front of a 
radar screen would be enough to set the retaliatory mechanism in motion. The 
fear of surprise attack- is a real danger, both in the United States and in the 
Soviet Union, as David Singer points out in the article from The Notion re- 
printed below. It is time for us all to face this danger, to recognize, 'end to do 
something about it. 
One man's suggestion for something to do about the whole problem of 
armaments, of which surprise attack is only a part, is contained in "Alternatives 
to the Arms Race," reprinted on page 9 of this pamphlet. 
SURPRISE ATTACK 
by  Ja David Singer 
DURING THE current wave of eu- sile was so great as almost to guaran- 
phoria which seems to have gripped tee that it would never be used. 
the world in the wake of the Khru- Man's faith in this "balance of ter- 
shchev and Eisenhower "journeys ror" is touching, but is also indic- 
to peace," it may be in poor taste to ative of the basic human tendency 
speak publicly' of surprise nuclear to deny the existence of dangers 
attack, but it may also be that it is too great to be comprehended and 
just such a period asathis which most too complex to be analyzed. One is 
requires a rather brutal analysis of reminded of superstitious villagers 
. Soviet-American relations. Even be- living on the slopes of a volcano or 
fore the journeys - symbolic ex- in the possible path of an avalanche. 
pressions of the peace-urge - were On the basis of a current study of 
made, many were contending that Soviet and Western military strategy, 
military technology had in a sense this writer believes that the danger of 
made itself obsolete, and that the surprise nuclear attack - in either 
destructive power of the nuclear mis- direction - is as great, if not great- 
er, now and for the next several 
years than i t  has been a t  any time 
since the cold war began. Let me 
try to summarize the evidence. 
FIRST of all, the two military coali- 
tions are still very much in a state 
of mutual hostility, and while there 
is increasing evidence that each de- 
sires to restrict the resultant con- 
flict and competition t o  the non- 
military realm; little has happened 
to hasten the elimination of violence. 
More precisely, as long as each side 
retains its capacity for military at- 
tack, the other must assume that 
such capacity might be utilized. As 
I suggested in an earlier article 
("New Hope for Disarmament," The 
Nation, Oct. 10, 1959), "each elite 
will inevitably equate the other's 
military capaiility- with his military 
 intention^." Since most Americans 
find it  almost impossible to believe 
that the Soviet could honestly fear 
an attack initiated by ourselves, let 
.us first examine the situation as it 
looks to the Kremlin. 
At the outset, there is the or- 
thodox Communist ideology which 
has consistently postulated that the 
64 capitalist camp" is inexorably com- 
pelled to seek the destruction of the 
"Socialist camp." Sometimes it is 
argued that the attack will come 
when the "imperialists" are power- 
ful enough to carry it  out successful- 
ly and with little fear of retaliation. 
Other times the argument is that it 
will come when the West sees that 
"Socialist victory" is almost inevi- 
table, and strikes out in a last, des- 
perate effort to stave off defeat. - 
From the Soviet viewpoint. this 
classic Leninist-Stalinist doctrine is 
supported by some significant his- 
torical experiences. The expedition- 
ary forces - with American contin- 
gents - which were landed in Russia - 
following the First World War have 
been co~tinually interpreted-right- 
ly or wrongly-by ~ o i i e t  leaders as 
abortive attempts to overthrow the 
Bolshevik regime by violent inter- 
vention. Similarly, the jockeying of 
England, France and the United 
States during the late 1930s was in- 
terpreted b; the Russians, then as 
now, as an effort to drive the Nazis 
and the Soviets into a war of such 
mutual destructiveness that the 
Western powers could then step in 
at  the end and divide up the spoils, 
thus obliterating Bolshevism at  little 
loss to themselves. (That this was not 
an altogether unfounded notion may 
be established by reference to  West- 
ern actions and communications of 
the period.) Even the delay in open- 
ing the second front during World 
War I1 has been viewed by the So- 
viet as further evidence of ill will 
on the part of their wartime allies. 
TURNING to the present, there is 
an even stronger basis for the Krem- 
lin's fear of surprise attack. Despite 
our protestations, they see the West- 
ern air bases on their periphery not 
as defensive or even retaliatory sites, 
but as springboards for aggression. 
For example, the IRBM sites in 
England, Italy and Turkey have 
been and are being built above 
ground, with little attention paid to  
their protection. And while our pur- 
pose in building them in this fashion 
was primarily to  achieve speed and 
economy, the Soviet strategist inter- 
prets the decision differently. If, he 
reasons, the West established the 
sites only for retaliatory purposes, 
they would have been more ade- 
quately protected; since they were 
not, i t  must follow that they are 
designed for launching a surprise, 
strike-first blow, after which what 
happens to them becomes unim- 
portant. In  sum, if the function of 
these launching sites is indeed mere- 
ly to  retaliate, would they have 
been left so vulnerable as to  en- 
danger their retaliatory capability? 
Furthermore, the entire military 
posture of NATO is such as t o  en- 
courage the Kremlin in its suspicions 
of Western intentions. All of the 
normal accouterments of a purely 
defensive effort have been under- 
supported in Europe and elsewhere; 
no real effort has been made to match 
the Warsaw nations in ground troops 
or conventional weapons. Converse- 
ly, Ileaviest emphasis has been upon 
strategic air power which, the West 
argues, is for purely retaliatory pur- 
poses. But since the same capability 
can be used for both strike-first and 
strike-back missions, the Soviet must 
operate from the less naive inter- 
pretatlon. 
Thus, the general outlines of the 
Western military posture are such 
as to  engender a high degree of fear 
in Soviet ranks, particularly when 
coupled with the not infrequent 
threats' uttered by high-ranking 
U.S. political and military officers. 
There is a tendency in the West 
to  discount the fears of attack artic- 
ulated by the Kremlin as propa- 
ganda designed to defame the United 
States and its allies. But two recent 
scholarly studies of Soviet military 
strategy, despite sharp disagreements 
on other points, come to  the same 
conclusion- on this one. In  War and 
the Soviet Union, Herbert Diner- 
stein notes that when Tank Marshal 
Rotmistrov argues (in Military 
Thought, February, 1955) that sur- 
prise attack plays "an important 
part in the strategy of the United 
States and Great Britain," the So- 
viet Marshal is reflecting the "offi- 
cial Soviet appraisal." And in Soviet 
Strategy in the Nuclear Age, Ray- 
mond Garthoff likewise concludes 
that "the dominant Soviet image 
of American military strategy is a 
massive, surprise air blow with weap- 
ons of mass destruction." 
All in all, there seem to be several 
excellent reasons for Soviet strate- 
gists to assume the probability of a .  
Western-initiated surprise attack. 
TURNING the coin over, do we 
find the same sort of fear on the 
Western side? And if so, is the fear 
equally justified? Without belabor- 
ing the arguments which' are all too 
familiar to  Americans, the answers 
must likewise be in the affirmative. 
Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe, 
the Middle East and Asia since 
World War I1 all lead to an image 
of aggressiveness. In  addition, there 
are the repeated Soviet references 
to inevitable "showdown" and ulti- 
mate "Socialist victory," coupled 
with similar assertions in the still 
unrepudiated writings of Lenin and 
Stalin. There is also the increasing - 
military power and technical prow- 
ess exhibited by the USSR in recent 
years. The Soviet now has, or soon 
will have, enough ICBMs to carry 
out a successful massive attack upon 
Western Europe and North America. 
Their submarine fleet is now esti- 
mated to be about 500-600 strong, 
with perhaps a hundred of them 
able to launch an IRBM from the 
relative safety of the ocean's depths. 
Thus, i t  would seem that there is 
a t  least as much justification for 
fear of massive surprise attack on 
the part of Western strategists' as 
among their opposite numbers in the 
USSR. And we have not yet dealt 
with some of the more subtle forces 
-that make even greater the legit- 
imacy of this reciprocal fear. 
ONE SUCH force today is that of 
military technology and its dramatic 
impact upon the role of time in 
strategy. This takes two forms, each 
equally ominous. The first has to 
do with the speed with which one 
side can deliver a stunning blow 
upon the other. In the pre-World 
War I days, a surprise attack of any 
significant magnitude was almost 
impossible; reserves had to be mobil- 
ized and rail transportation convert- 
ed to military purposes. Even in the 
pre-World War I1 era, destructive- 
ness could arrive no sooner than the 
200 or so miles per hour limit im- 
posed by the aircraft of the day, 
and - assuming a state of near 
alert - there was always the ability 
to counter any attack with defensive 
craft and AA fire. But in the waning 
days of that war, the German V-2 
ballistic missile gave us the fore- 
warning of things to come. Here a 
weapon of considerable magnitude 
could be delivered from fifty miles 
away in a matter of minutes. More 
to the point, it could not be detected 
until on its final, downward trajec- 
tory, seconds before it landed on its 
target; and there was almost no way 
of intercepting it. Had the Nazis 
been able to produce the V-2 six 
months sooner, and to increase its 
range earlier, the Axis might well 
have come out victorious. 
Today, each side has land- and 
sea-based IRBMs with ranges up to 
1,800 miles, capable of delivering 
megaton n~~clear  warheads at speeds 
up to Mach 15 (fifteen times the 
speed of sound), and the USSR al- 
ready is believed to possess a "signif- 
icant" number of operational ICBMs, 
with about a hindred launching 
sites, and ranges up to 6,200 miles. 
The warning time is even less than 
that for the V-2, interception is 
currently impossible, and destruc- 
tive power staggering. Either side 
could destroy most of the other's 
industrial and population centers, 
as well as its retaliatory military 
bases, with less than twenty minutes' 
warning time and with little chance 
of effective defense. The strategic 
impact of such a surprise attack is 
so great that it  could conceivably 
lead to military victory in less than 
twenty-four hours. 
The mutual awareness of such a 
possibility makes the situation more, 
rather than less, dangerous. Realiz- 
ing the implications of a successful 
surprise attack upon itself, each side 
assumes that the other must be con- 
sidering it. Thus begins the vicious 
psychological cycle which leads in 
turn to consideration of both pre- 
ventive and pre-emptive attacks. If 
the planners on one side become con- 
vinced that the other is about to 
strike first, they have little choice 
but to try beating the adversary to 
the punch. Suppose that Western 
intelligence agencies begin to piece 
together enough evidence to per- 
suade them (correctly or not) that 
the Soviet is planning such a strike 
in late October, as soon as the har- 
vest is in. The natural response is to 
strike first. Suspecting that this is 
the Western decision, the Soviets 
(even if they had not originally in- 
tended a first strike) must now de- 
cide, in turn, to forestall this tragedy 
by getting in the first strike them- 
selves. And so it goes, until one side 
or the o ~ h e r  precipitates nuclear 
World War 111 through a "preven- 
tive" attack. 
Even more likely, however, is the 
stumbling into war by what is called 
a "pre-ernptive" strike. Here .one 
side or the other picks up enough 
radar information (via Dewline or 
backscatter technique) to  convince 
them that an attack has just been 
launched. Again, this information 
may or may not be accurate, but the 
risks of waiting are so great that 
a "counterattack" must be launched 
instantaneously. By error or mis- 
calculation, this "retaliatory" blow 
may turn out to be, instead, a strike- 
first rather than a strike-back blow. 
This highly unstable situation is 
made even more perilous by the 
second form which the impact of 
technology upon time may take. 
Here reference is to the fear of 
rnajor technological "breakthrough." 
Suppose, for a realistic example, 
that Western strategists become 
convinced that the Soviet is on the 
verge of producing a successful anti- 
missile device. With such a break- 
through, the Kremlin could be as- 
sured of delivering a devastating 
blow to the United States or Europe 
while suffering far less damage from 
a retaliatory blow. This might well 
tempt Khrushchev to exploit his 
enormously significant, if temporary, 
advantage. And even if it did not 
have this effect, United States or 
NATO strategists might well as- 
sume that i t  did. Thus the West 
might decide to strike first. 
These are not the ungrounded 
fears of the paranoid, but rather 
the kind of calculations which do 
and should take place daily in mil- 
itary and political circles on both 
sides. Not that either side wants nu- 
clear war. T o  the contrary, each 
wants desperately to avoid it, but 
the exigencies of the situation and 
the way in which the strategists have 
responded to these exigencies sug- 
gest that current and recent Soviet- 
Western behavior can only make 
lnore likely this nuclear holocaust. 
AWAKE of the dead-end which the 
constant and reciprocal increase of 
retaliatory fire power may lead to, 
those who make and study national 
strategies have recently begun to 
explore some 'new alternatives. This 
exploration is characterized by a 
degree of intellectual sophistication 
which would jar those who still be- 
lieve in the "military mind" stereo- 
type. The strategist of today, in the 
West or in the Soviet bloc, reads 
more, thinks ,more and writes more 
regarding the complexities of his pro- 
fession; and while few can be said to  
have developed the requisite broad 
view of international politics, most 
have become far more rigorous and 
systematic in their analyses. It may 
be small comfort for those of us 
outside the decison-making ranks, 
but this trend does at  least promise 
greater accuracy in predicting the 
other side's response. 
Having said this, we move on to 
some of the less obvious and less 
traditional techniques which are now 
under consideration. 
One approach, currently much in 
vogue, is to  attempt to  make one's 
retaliatory capability not only more 
powerful, but less vdnerable. One 
way of doing this is to move missile- 
lainching sites underground, with 
greater protection via reinforced 
concrete, etc. Such sites could then 
be capable of launching a devastat- 
ing counter-blow even after a sur- 
prise attack, unless they received 
direct hits. But as guidance systems 
improve (and they are being im- 
proved rapidly) ,direct hits can be 
anticipated with increasing certainty, 
and it will merely be a matter of 
putting a enough warhead 
on the missile to penetrate the pro- 
tection given the retaliatory site. 
Furthermore, the greater the de- 
structiveness of the warhead, the 
less need there is for accuracy: a 
near miss by a five-megaton warhead 
is just as effective as a direct hit 
with one megaton. So the under- 
ground site may merely encourage 
the building of bigger warheads. 
And, of course, installation costs 
and building time are much greater 
for protected or underground sites. 
Another way of decreasing the 
vulnerability of one's retaliatory 
power is to shift from fixed to mobile 
missile sites; trailer trucks, railroad 
cars, naval vessels and submarines 
all come under this category (with 
the last-named getting most of the 
attention). Again, the idea is that 
by making retaliatory sites more dif- 
ficult to detect, the potential aggres- 
sor will be deterred by the knowl- 
edge that no matter how sweeping 
and saturating his first strike is, 
most of the retaliatory force will 
survive to deliver a speedy reprisal. 
Here the prospects are somewhat 
brighter, but they should not be ex- 
aggerated. Not only do the same 
arguments regarding fixed "hard" 
sites obtain, in that the larger weap- 
on can destroy without a direct hit, 
but other considerations also enter. 
IT IS naive to think that, as some 
have argued, the submarine is "virtu- 
ally undetectable.'' Underwater de- 
tection techniques are improving 
quite rapidly, and i t  is probably 
only a matter of time before the seas 
will be just as susceptible to electron- 
ic monitoring as are the skies to- 
day. And the irony is that the same 
NATO people who are convinced 
that the USSR cannot hope to oper- 
ate effectively underseas against the 
Western ASW (anti-submarine war- 
fare) system also believe that U.S. 
submarines can maneuver and fire 
with near impunity. 
Finally, the number of missile- 
launching submarines necessary to  
present an effective deterrent retali- 
atory force is well into the hundreds, 
considerably beyond what either side 
has or is willing to build in the next 
few years. And since only a nuclear- 
powered submarine can stay under- 
water for any long period of time - 
and thus avoid rapid detection - 
both sides would have to multiply 
many times over the handful of Po- 
laris or Golem-equipped vessels now 
in operation. 
Thus, a mobile and evasive retali- 
atory force may have some likeli- 
hood of deterring a surprise attack, 
but it cannot be viewed as even ap- 
proaching a solution of the problem. 
Still another approach to surprise 
attack, and one gaining increasing 
prominence, is in the area of passive, 
or civil, defense. If, it is contended. 
each side can protect most of it; 
population from destruction by corn- 
hining an effective early-warning 
system with a large number of fall- 
out shelters, the other will be able to  
do less damage and thus be less 
inclined to strike first. Here is one 
of the more fatuous lines of reason- 
ing to emerge from the distorted 
world of the cold war. For clearly, 
as long as no serious civil-defense 
program exists on either side (and 
this is certainly the case today), 
there is that much less inclination 
on each side to beIieve that the 
other is planning a nuclear strike. 
Conversely, such a program, once 
launched, might well persuade the 
other that the motivation is to pro- 
tect industrial and military workers 
from retaliation after striking the 
first blow. In a sense, unprotected 
civilians are a highly persuasive in- 
dication of peaceful intent, and each 
side may well regard the other's ex- 
posed population as a hostage to  
peace. Furthermore, almost any 
shelter system can be partially com- 
pensated for by stepping up the size 
1 
and radioactivity of the warheads 
employed. There may be a good case 
for civil defense, but it has yet to  be 
made, and as a deterrent to surprise 
attack i t  makes no sense at  all. 
LET US turn now from the threat- 
of-reprisal as a deterrent to  surprise 
attack to some less known, but per- 
haps more promising, techhiquei. If, 
as has been suggested, the real dan- 
ger lies not in a cold-blooded deci- 
sion to  instigate World War I11 by. 
unprovoked surprise nuclear attack, 
but in its launching by accident and 
miscalculation, our efforts should be 
in the direction of reducing the 
chance of miscalcuIation. This in 
turn requires that each side have 
more information about the other's 
intentions and behavior, rather than 
less. The primary objective here is 
to have each side as certain as pos- - 
sible that the other is not planning 
a surprise strike, and that any "evi- 
dence" to the contrary be quickly 
and credibly rejected. The same 
holds true of information tending to 
persuade one side that the other has 
already Zaunchcd, or not launched, 
an attack. 
Now it is clear at the outset that 
no amount of verbal protestation by 
one sicre or the other will be suffi- 
cient for these purppses. The fear 
and suspicion sown by fifteen years 
of cold war is too deep. A more re- 
liable and authentic assurance is 
required, one which can be relied 
upon to inform not only when at- 
tack or plans for attack are under 
way, but when they are not under 
way. That is, any reliable monitor- 
ing- system must b e  equally able to  
supply negative as well as positive 
believable information. 
In the present transition period 
from aircraft to missile delivery, how 
can these requirements be met? To  
be more precise, how can each side 
know that those radar blips are 
birds and not planes, commercial 
and not military craft, meteors and 
not missiles? How can each know 
that those SAC flights are for train- 
ing and not attack, or that an atom- 
ic explosion was a civilian accident 
and not  a military strike? More- 
over, not only must both countries 
know the truth, but there must be 
assurance that each .knows that the 
other knows it. Otherwise country 
A, fearing that country B will "re- 
taliate" in ignorance, may itself be 
tempted to strike first, after all. And 
what about the so-called "catalytic 
strike" launched upon one or both 
sides by a third party which calcu- 
lates a gain for itself out of a Soviet- 
Western war? As long as there is 
no agreement on a test ban, and nu- 
clear weapons threaten to prolifer- 
ate, this will become hcreas- 
ingly pressing. 
IT WOULD appear that a combina- 
tion of techniques is essential if the 
necessary information is to be com- 
municated rapidly and reliably. First, 
there must be some form of aerial 
inspection as originally outlined in 
thd Eisenhower "open ski.es" pro- 
posal. Inspection aircraft must  be 
flown on a round-the-clock basis, 
at  a variety of altitudes, over West- 
ern, soviet-and in-between territory. 
Equipped with closed-loop TV, infra- 
red cameras, radar, stabilized bi- 
noculars and long-distance raclio- 
transmission equipment, these craft 
could provide much of- the needed 
negative information promptly, ac- 
curately and continuously. As the 
national satellite programs (such as 
Project Samos) develop, satellites 
could gradually replace the manned 
aircraft. In addition, the "back-scnt- 
term technique revealed by Project 
Tepee could be employed. This is a 
technique for detecting a flying mis- 
sile by observing the ionization of 
the air in its wake. There is also un- 
der development a promising new 
fensive-retaliatory weapons (there 
is little difference), would actually 
increase rather than decrease its se- 
curity: its launching sites would 
then become hostages to its own 
good faith. 
Regardless of where the observers 
are posted, they must be provided 
with an independent and reliable 
communication network connecting 
all observation teams with key 
strategic command posts on each 
side. It is estimated that at least a 
thousand observers would be need- 
ed; preferably they should be re- 
"over-the-horizon" radar system 
known as Madres. 
Parenthetically, even if no agree- 
ment for avoiding surprise attacks - 
is negotiated in the near fi~ture, 
the West would be wise - if un- 
orthodox - to share its missile- 
monitoring information with the 
Warsaw Pact states. This would be 
one more way of giving hem a great- 
er warning time, hence a longer re- 
sponse time, and thus reduce any 
temptation for them to launch a 
tot ally unnecessary pre-emptive 
strike. Likewise, the side which first 
a solid-fuel missile propel- 
lant ought to make i t  available t o  
the other. Since the count-down time 
for solid-fueled missiles is less than 
for the liquid~fueled, they can be 
held back for a longer period, giving 
more time to determine whether the 
opponent has in fact mounted an at- 
tack. 
Beyond all this, it would probably 
be essential to station observers on 
the ground at some fraction of each 
cruited from U.N. personnel of neu- 
tral nationality, some from each 
of the two blocs involved. 
The problems are great and the 
considerable innovations, political 
and, technological, necessary for so- 
lutions may not be forthcoming. And 
even the institution of a reasonably 
reliable scheme against surprise at- 
tack would not provide the final 
answer to the present terrifying ar- 
maments race. There is far more to 
i t  than this. But any system which 
can break through the current stale- 
mate; help stabilize the balance of 
terror, and perhaps set the precedent 
for a subsequent attack on weap- 
ons-testing, production and deploy- 
ment, can only be welcomed. And as 
important as the atom-testing ban 
and political settlement may be, the 
prevention of surprise attack is by 
far the most urgent issue. It should 
be given top priority, both in the 
political councils and research labor- 
atories of the world. Time is mot on 
the side of mankind. 
u 
side's launching sites, and in their 
J. DAVID Sln'GER is teaching Po- 
aircraft and submarines. And it may litical science at the University of well be that for each side to reveal Michigan 
to the other the positions of its of- 
Reprinted with p e r h s w n  of the author and THE NATION from the January 30, 1960 
issue of THE NATION. 
ALTERNATIVES TO THE ARMS RACE - 
DRASmC BUT THINKABLE 
by 
W. H. Ferry 
The following letter was written to the Santa Barbara 
News-Press by W. H .  Ferry, Vice-president of the Fund for 
the Republic. It appeared in the January 13, 1960 issue of 
the News-Press and is reprinted here with permission of 
the editor. 
Editor, News-Press: When one says that war is unthinkable, it 
must be taken as a literal statement, i.e., nuclear war cannot be 
thought about. We have no vocabulary, no recourse to imaginaticin 
sufficient to deal in logical terms with the prospect of 60 or 70 million 
American corpses, to say nothing about the carnage accompanying 
a nuclear attack, and to say nothing of the effects of radiation linger- 
ing over generations. 
Perhaps this is one reason why all current assessments of the 
impasse between Russia and the United States end up in the same 
sterile and hopeless formula: Arms and yet more arms. 
In commenting on the reports of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund 
and the Stanford and Johns Hopkins research groups your editorial 
(Jan. 8) comes to the same fruitless conclusion, that since we cannot 
think of mything else to do, let us continue with all speed to make 
bombs, gas, germs, rockets, missiles and submarines. 
Suppose we were to go in the other direction? Suppose we were 
to junk all of our weapons of whatever kind? Suppose we were to tell 
the world that we are doing-so because we are convinced that it is 
the only practical way out of the fateful dilemma in which all are 
caught? 
The best possible result of such a decision is that it would give 
us the unquestioned moral leadership of an apprehensive world, that 
Russia would follow our example because of its declared eagerness 
to compete and surpass on grounds other than anned might, and that 
all could turn to the solution of humanity's pressing problems. 
The worst possible result is that Russia would instantly take 
advantage of our defenselessness to bomb the U.S. into radioactive 
rubble. In this case we would not be worse off than if we had engaged 
in a two-way war. All that would be lacking would be a regret among 
survivors that we had not had vengeance on our attackers. But this 
result seems wholly unlikely. It may better be supposed that Rusk 
does not desire the extinction of the US. but its su'lnnissm a 
nation and great production center to Comm- 
Another and more possible result then is that this country would 
be taken over by the Reds, cornmissass replacing our managers and 
mayors, legislators and union offiicials, broadcasters and publishw. 
(We may dso presume similar action in those countries of Western 
Empe  and elsewhere for which our arms are said to provide a 
shield.) This is a desperate and repellent vision; and while I do not 
believe that this would be the outcome, it % necessary to accept it 
as a possibility if one is willing to argue that unilateral clhrmame;nt 
is the only practical policy for this country to adopt. Red domination 
of this and other free nations is at least "thinkable." We can at feast 
imagine it in all its hateful and dismal aspects, while we fmd the 
consequences of a nuclear, germ, and gas war unfhhkable and un- 
imaginable. We would survive as a nation with the greatest of 
traditions and with the unquenchable intention of demonstrating by 
argument and peacable resistance the power of freedom and justice 
as man's best and only proper organizing principles. 
It might well take years or decades to regenerate f d m  and 
justice. But we would have the chance to do so, a chance that by 
common agreement would not be vouchsafed us in the case of an 
all-out war which no nation could win. Should war come the task 
would not be resisting or throwing off the hand of an oppressor by 
reasonable means; it would be the task of rebuilding civilization from 
barbarism and chaos. 
It is said that we a n  now following the only feasible road in 
seeking disarmament with ironclad agreements on inspection. This is 
not the "middle road" it is claimed to be, for the preparations for 
war continue without let-up. This argument contakw, moreover, fatal 
fallacies. Inspection cannot be devised that will give *lute assur- 
ance against manufacture or stockpiling of lethal weapons. Highly 
productive countries like the U.S. and Russia will always be able 
to maintain facilities for making such axms, convertible almost over- 
night from peacetime industry. An inspection system is institutional- 
ized distrust, and as fragile as any understanding so based. 
The alternatives are drastic and repugnant in the highest degree. 
But the important point is that there is an alternative to our present 
policy. 
FOR FURTHER READING 
1. The Arms Race, by Phiip Noel-Baker. London, Atlantic Book Publishing Co., 1958. 
p. $4.80. A Nobel Peace Prize winner appraises the world situation and the pros- 
for securing a dhrmament agreement, 
ken Shield, A Look at the Anti-Missile Missile and America's Military Defense. 
Reprinted by American Friends Service Committee, 1958. 24 pp. lo$. Five articles by 
Don Schwartz which appeared first in the Chicago Sun-Times. 
3. An Idea Whose Time Has Come? Reprinted by American Friends Service Committee, 
1959. 7 pp. 5 ~ .  Reprints from Canadian and American newspapers and magazines point 
out that the idea of voluntary surrender of power, once proclaimed only by a few 
pmhets, has become politically relevant. 
4. The Morals of E x t e ~ ~ n a t i o n ,  by Lewis Mumford. Reprinted f r t n  The Atlantic, October, 
1959, by American Friends Service Committee. 16 pp. 1&. . . . most Americans do 
not realize that (a moral breakdown) has taken place or, worse, that it makes any 
difhirence." Mumford calls for a new approach to foreign policy. 
5. Speak Truth to Power, A Quaker Study of International Conflict. Philadelphia, American 
Friends Service Committee, 1955. 72 pp. 25~ .  Presents an alternative to violence in 
settling international problems. . 
6. "Surprise Attack and Disarmament," by Thomas C. Schelling. BuUetin of the Atomic 
- 
Scientists, December, 1959, pp. 413-418. Identifies the swprise attack problem with the 
vulnerability of retaliatory forces. 
The above items (except for no. 6 )  are available from American Friendi Service 
Committee. 
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